: The evolution of the U.S. war on terrorism is on a path that poses a substantial probability of losing to it, although not necessarily of a victory by its declared targets. That conclusion follows from the definition presented of terrorism and thus central questions about the merits of responses justified by an objective of reducing it. Likely American responses to 9/11 are suggested by a review of well‐known policy‐making tendencies from past scholarship and experience, tendencies well‐established prior to 9/11 (...) and by no means unique to the Bush II presidency. The expectations those tendencies suggest have been born out by what the United States has done and not done. Well‐established criteria and their implied rules of practice for security enhancing great‐power statecraft are presented, and the chosen U.S. program of action is found to be counter‐productive in their light. (shrink)

Understanding defensive internationalism: black, white, or shades of gray -- Clubs, identities, and institutions: a tale of overlapping interests -- Domestic support for contributions: how stable and strong? -- International development assistance -- International debt management and relief -- United Nations peacekeeping operations -- Pursuing international environmental quality -- A global prognosis of muted optimism?

To understand the prospects for global order and progress in the coming years, we explore the joint implications of three premises: (1) states advantaged by the current international order have stakes in its regularity and predictability, and thus in moving to counter or prevent threats to those stakes; (2) along impure public and club goods lines, they are more likely to make efforts to do so when some private or club benefits result; and (3) public opinion provides a bounded policy (...) acceptance envelope offering incentives and disincentives to national political elites to act as envisioned by the first two premises. We present a mosaic of public opinion in major OECD countries (the US, Japan, and major EU members) on three policy areas that contain international public goods elements. Actual contribution tendencies in those areas found in our previous work largely conform to the public opinion patterns reported here. Within the limits of available data, domestic political incentives as represented by public opinion warrant neither extreme optimism nor pessimism about the prospects for continuing contributions by OECD states to sustaining orderly functioning of the current world system. (shrink)